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Certainty, Probability, and Stalin’s Great Party Purge
ABSTRACT
In 1935, Stalin decided to purge his own
party to consolidate power in the Soviet
government. Since the inception of historical
research about this event, a debate has
developed regarding the number of arrests
and deaths of Soviets ordered by Stalin. This
study will examine the figures calculated
by Western historians to determine where
correlation and discrepancy exist. The
importance of this research is to assess
the reasons why such dramatic statistical
differences exist among various historians.
The historians’ sources show the difficulty of
determining accurate figures because of the
secretive nature of the Soviet government
and only partial opening of Soviet archives.
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In 1936, Josef Stalin, General Secretary
of the Communist Party of the Soviet
Union [CPSU], initiated a Party Purge,
the extent of which, measured by the
numbers of deaths and arrests of Party
members and their affiliates, has proved
to be highly controversial. A longsimmering historical debate about this
issue surprisingly deepened after the fall
of the Soviet Union brought about the
partial opening of government archives
that many thought would answer all
questions. Part of the problem is that the
numbers have ideological significance:
for example, the lower the figures,
the more “normal” the USSR appears,
making it possible that it could have
become a social democracy on the
welfare state model. Conversely, the
higher the figures, the more “surreal”
the whole Soviet experience seems,
making it virtually impossible to believe
that it could have mutated into
anything that would have prevented
ultimate catastrophe.
The most influential participants
in the “purge debate” are J. Arch
Getty and Robert Conquest. Getty’s
numbers of deaths and arrests are low
in comparison to Conquest’s vastly
higher figures. Much has been made of
Getty’s “revisionism” and Conquest has
been pilloried as a “Cold Warrior,” but
a study of the sources used by these
two historians better explains how they
arrived at their conclusions than do
their politics and the rhetoric of their
friends and enemies.
In the late 1980s, when Mikhail
Gorbachev’s policy of glasnost began
the long-anticipated opening of the
state archives, the dispute about the
Soviet Union’s capacity to develop into a
“normal” social democracy gained a new
intensity. One of the key questions was,
and remains, the extent of the actual
human cost of Soviet socialism. Basically,
it was a question of scale. Many believed
that the archives possessed the necessary
evidence to settle this matter once and
for all.
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The question of the extent of the
terror that Stalin’s Communist Party
unleashed upon the Soviet people
became a battleground for historians.
Those who believed that the USSR was
in the midst of evolving into a social
democracy downplayed the harsh
traits and ideology of Stalin’s regime.
These historians argued in favor of a
paradigm centered on “grass roots”
mechanisms of modernization such as
upward social mobility coupled with
the problems of mass industrialization
within a ten-year period.
The problem of the human cost of
socialism encompasses many subjects,
such as forced collectivization and
slave labor, but the Party Purge of the
late 1930s remains the emblematic
focal point. Once seen by traditional
scholars as “totalitarian,” in the hands
of revisionists, who began collecting
evidence to discredit “the t-word,” the
Purge took on a new look. Essential to

the revisionist task was a body count
low enough to suggest the credibility
of a Soviet Union on the road to
social democracy.
The Party Purge was not the first
episode of terror within the Soviet
Union. Beginning with the severe
policy of War Communism under
Lenin, and continuing with Stalin’s
forced collectivization and mass
industrialization, the Soviet people had
already experienced extensive pain and
death at the hands of the Bolsheviks.
But the great Party Purge was unique
because it was the first time that the
target had shifted to the Party itself.
As a means to further solidify his
own power, Stalin used the December
1, 1934 assassination of Kirov, the
Leningrad Party chief, as an excuse
to begin the cleansing. The project
slowly gained momentum as the NKVD
fabricated accusations of Trotskyite
and Zinovien conspiracies, charging

people within and without the Party
of counter-revolutionary crimes. The
height of the Purge was from 1937 to
1938 when most of the Old Bolsheviks,
Lenin’s closest associates at the time
of the Revolution, were subjected
to humiliating show trials ending in
executions and long sentences to the
growing prison camp system.
After the fall of the Soviet Union
and the partial opening of the archives,
Conquest and Getty both focused
their research on the Stalinist era,
specifically on the Purge. The most
notable difference between the two
historians’ respective works is the scale
of their respective totals of arrests,
camp populations, camp deaths, and
executions within the Soviet Union from
1936 to 1938.

Figure 1. Comparison of J. Arch Getty and Robert Conquest’s arrests, camp population,
camp deaths, and executions for 1936–1938 Party Purge of the Soviet Union
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Robert Conquest, who was born
July 15, 1917, attended Winchester
College, Grenoble, and Magdalen
College, Oxford. Conquest joined the
Communist Party in 1937 and fought in
the British light infantry during World
War II. After the war ended, Conquest
left the Communist Party and joined the
Foreign Office, where he remained until
1956. He is the author of seventeen
books on Soviet history and politics. His
best-known work, The Great Terror, was
published in 1968 and then again in
1990, in a revised edition.1
In The Great Terror, Conquest
attempts to explain Stalin’s motives and
methods as he began the Party Purge.
Regrettably, during the 1960s, when
Conquest was researching his book,
the Soviet Union was a closed society,
or in other words, was unwilling to
share information with the international
community concerning certain events
that had taken place within its borders.
Although much had been learned from
Nikita Khrushchev’s famous 1956 XX
Party Congress “Secret Speech” and
from the campaign of “de-Stalinization”
that followed, to estimate the true
scale of the Purge Conquest really had
no choice but to turn to alternative
sources of information. However, the
rapid decline of the Soviet Union after
Mikhail Gorbachev took power in 1985
opened up many sources of information
previously unavailable. Hence, Conquest
continued his research and published
his revised version of The Great Terror
in 1990. Conquest concludes that
approximately seven million Soviet
citizens were arrested from 1937 to
1938, and of these, approximately one
million were executed and two million
died in camps. Another one million

people remained in prison throughout
1938, and roughly eight million people
were confined in the system of NKVD
labor camps administered by an organ
now known simply as the Gulag.
Conquest uses interviews with former
inmates of the Gulag system as one of
his main sources. The transcripts of
these interviews are difficult to obtain
because Conquest fails to document
where they can be found. Nonetheless,
independent interviews with former
Gulag inmates completed by the United
States Congress in 1970 confirm
Conquest’s numbers.
Conquest also relies on several
newspaper and magazine articles from
the Soviet Union and present-day
Russia. These sources include Russian
newspapers: Yunost’, Agitator, Moscow
News, and Sotsialisticheskaia Industriia.
Although these papers and periodicals
are not readily available in the United
States, I was able to find two articles
from Moscow News that Conquest uses:
one dated week number eighteen of
1988 and the other week forty-eight of
1988. From the week eighteen article,
Conquest uses the number of executions
within Uzbekistan, approximately forty
thousand, to extrapolate figures for the
entire Soviet Union.2 Conquest also uses
the article of week forty-eight, written
by Roy Medvedev, a famous dissident
who estimates that the number of Purge
victims ranges from 16 to18 million
arrests, of which 10 million either died
or were murdered.3 One controversial
aspect of Medvedev’s article is that
it originated from an organization
called Memorial, a famous glasnost-era
institution still dedicated to preserving
the memory of the men and women
who fell victim to Stalin’s Purge. Some

say that Memorial’s agenda promotes
higher figures of deaths and arrests in
order to demonize Stalin.
Forensic work also uncovered mass
graves within the former Soviet Union.
In an article titled, “Unearthing the
Great Terror,” Conquest says about
the graves: “Revisionists’ estimates for
the whole USSR could be tucked into
a single corner of…one gravesite of a
single minor republican capital.”4 For
evidence that Byelorussian executions
numbered somewhere between 250,000
and 300,000, Conquest relies on several
articles written about Soviet mass graves.
Of course, owing to the impossibility
of exhuming all of the many suspected
modern mass burial mounds in the
Byelorussian region, these totals are
difficult to confirm.
One of Conquest’s more unique
sources is the Japanese Navy’s record of
ships entering and leaving the enormous
Kolyma camp region dedicated chiefly
to mining gold in the Arctic wilderness
of northeastern Siberia. While Kolyma
was in operation, the only way to
receive goods or export gold was for
Soviet ships to pass through Japanese
waters. The Japanese routinely stopped
these vessels to perform customs
searches, thus recording estimates of
the populations of workers’ camps and
the amount of gold Soviet prisons were
producing. The records reveal that each
of five ships carried approximately
4,000 prisoners and completed 10 to 11
journeys annually, thus leading to a total
of 200,000 to 220,000 prisoners being
transported each year.5
J. Arch Getty, the best and most
famous of the revisionists, was born in
Louisiana and received a BA from the
University of Pennsylvania in 1972, and
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his PhD from Boston College in 1979.
Currently, Professor Getty teaches at
the University of California at Los
Angeles. He is the author of five books
and many articles. In his study titled
The Road to Terror, Getty produces
estimates of the number of executions,
arrests, camp populations, and camp
deaths from 1937 to 1938: total
arrests approximately 2.5 million,
camp populations from 1.9 million,
camp deaths at 160,084 and
executions at 681,692.
Throughout The Road to Terror,
Getty refers to an article written in
collaboration with Gabor T. Rittersporn
and Viktor N. Zemskov, who compare
and contrast several different estimates
of the number of “victims” during
Stalin’s great Purge, including those by
Conquest, Dmitri Volkogonov, and
Roy A. Medvedev. In comparison to
these, Getty’s figures are much lower
and have the advantage of precise
archival documentation.
In addition to archival sources, Getty
also uses the newspaper Pravda, and in
particular, an article published on 22
June 1989, exploring the damage that
Stalin caused to the Russian economy
and people, thereby harming the
country’s defense during World War
II. The author, G. Kumanev, provides
execution figures for 1936 of 1,118
and for 1937 of 353,074. Kumanev
comments on the figures arguing
that they seemed to be purposefully
lowered and/or inaccurate (in Russian,
“ЗаНИЖеННЬІМИ”).6 Another article used
by Getty is in Pravda, 14 February
1990. The unnamed author numbers
the 1930–1953 executions for
“counterrevolutionary and state crimes”
at 786,098. According to the article, the
source for these figures was the KGB.7
The most significant source used
by Getty is the Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv

Rossisskoi Federatsii (GARF); from
the documents he found there, Getty
creates a table of figures for arrests
and sentences. These derive from
documents in fond 9401 of the NKVD
archival material. Getty also uses fond
9401 for other statistics, such as those
concerning persons banished in efforts
to collectivize agriculture, and those
executed from 1937 to 1938.8 Getty
utilizes another fond, 9414, for figures
of the number of prison inmates in the
beginning of 1938 and camp deaths and
camp sentences from 1935 to 1940.
Getty also employed documents
from the Federal Archives in other
publications. For example, several times
throughout his article entitled “Victims,”
he cites GARF documents as sources for
the number of deaths and arrests during
the Purge. He employs documents from
fond 9401 to compare percentages of
convictions and arrests during 1937–
1938, and fond 9401 documents also
appear throughout the article.
Because of the wide discrepancy
between the figures arrived at by the
accepted authorities on the subject,
chiefly by Conquest and Getty, the most
recent books on Stalin’s Purge avoid the
question of numbers. One suspects that
this also is done to avoid appearing to
be a “Cold Warrior” like Conquest or
a “revisionist” like Getty. For example,
in her widely acclaimed 2003 book on
the Gulag, Anne Applebaum effectively
avoids giving specific numbers in terms
of arrests, executions, and deaths within
the camp system.9
When comparing historians’
conclusions, analyzing the sources is
very important. Conquest utilizes a
wide variety in compiling his totals.
However, there is little or no supporting
documentary evidence. Getty, on the
other hand, has more precise numbers,
but they are derived from a very

narrow range of sources. Also, Getty’s
estimates lack credibility because they
are implausible in light of the evidence
accumulating from forensic archaeology,
the oral tradition, and other nonarchival sources.
This is part of a larger pattern
of research differences, a tradition
born out of the nineteenth century
“old history” and the emergence of
a 20th century “new history.” Old
history emphasizes the importance
of documents primarily from archival
sources, while new history takes
into account a much wider range of
sources such as sociology, economics,
psychology, anthropology, and
archaeology. Getty is squarely in
the “old history” tradition, whereas
Conquest was compelled to rely on
“new history” evidence.
These two historians are at odds in
the debate over the potential transition
of the Soviet Union into a social
democracy because of the methods and
sources used to determine the number
of Purge victims. Regardless of whether
or not their personal ideologies support
or deny the theory of social democracy,
the evidence they present will be used
by scholars far into the future.
At present, what we can say, without
checking out the sources ourselves, is
that Getty’s figures can be taken as a
reliable minimum and Conquest’s as a
reliable maximum. One is a certainty
and the other a probability, and at
present they are so far apart that even
specialists in the field of Soviet history
are reluctant to choose. Let us hope that
future generations will be more apt to
diversify their sources and consider both
archival documents and non-archival
evidence to come to a consensus about
what is certainly one of the greatest
atrocities of modern times.
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